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RECENT DECISIONS
ADMIRALTY-REQUIREMENT

OF MINIMUM CONTACTS FOR
JURISDICTION TO ATTACH PROPERTY OF NONRESIDENT DEFENDANT IS
NOT APPLICABLE TO MARITIME ATTACHMENT

I.

FACTS AND HOLDING

Plaintiff, a Bahamian corporation,I filed this action in admiralty
to recover the value of fuel oil and other incidental services rendered to a Soviet flag vessel2 while allegedly under charter to defendants, citizens of Canada.3 Plaintiff's claim was based on an agreement whereby it provided fuel at a cost of $40,363.68 plus barge
services valued at $600.00. Defendants were to deposit $45,000 with
plaintiff to cover the cost of fuel and services, with plaintiff obligated to return any excess. Defendants allegedly failed to make the
required deposit and have not paid any of the amount due. Plaintiff claimed in personam jurisdiction for the court based on the
maritime attachment provisions in Supplemental Rule B(1) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 4 under which plaintiff attached
$8,851.38 on deposit by Pacific Seatrans in a bank within the geographic confines of the district. The defendants filed a motion to
1. Grand Bahama Petroleum Co., Ltd. owns and operates a ship fueling facility at Freeport, Grand Bahama Island.
2. The vessel, MlVKuibshevges, is owned by Murmansk Shipping Company.
The owners are not involved in this suit.
3. The defendants include Canadian Transportation Agencies, Ltd., Seatrans
Co., Ltd. and Odd Munsen. Canadian Transportation Agencies, Ltd. is recognized by the court as doing business as Seatrans, CTA/Seatrans, Pacific Seatrans
Co. and PAC Seatrans Co.
4. With respect to any admiralty or maritime claim in personam a verified complaint may contain a prayer for process to attach the defendant's
goods and chattels, or credits and effects in the hands of garnishees named
in the complaint to the amount sued for, if the defendant shall not be found
within the district. Such a complaint shall be accompanied by an affidavit
signed by the plaintiff or his attorney that, to the affiant's knowledge, or
to the best of his information and belief, the defendant cannot be found
within the district. When a verified complaint is supported by such an
affidavit the clerk shall forthwith issue a summons and process of attachment and garnishment. In addition, or in the alternative, the plaintiff may,
pursuant to Rule 4(e) invoke the remedies provided by state law for attachment and garnishment or similar seizure of the defendant's property. Except for Rule E(8) these supplemental Rules do not apply to state remedies
so invoked.
FED. R. Civ. P. Supp. R. B(1).
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dismiss the action for lack of jurisdiction on the grounds that Supplemental Rule B(1) violated substantive and procedural due process guarantees of the Constitution. Defendants based their motion on the holding in Shaffer v. Heitner5 and the argument that
the attachment procedure provided by Rule B(1) is improper in
that it provides inadequate procedural protection against mistaken deprivation of property. Held: The United States Supreme
Court holding in Shaffer v. Heitner requiring minimum contacts
before jurisdiction may be exercised in cases involving the attachment of property of a nonresident defendant does not reach maritime attachment; however, the attachment procedure provided
under the Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims, Rule B(1), is violative of due process in that it does
not provide sufficient protection for nonresident defendants from
mistaken deprivation of property. Grand Bahama Petroleum Co.,
Ltd. v. Canadian Transport Agencies, Ltd., 450 F. Supp. 447
(W.D. Wash. 1978).
II.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

The United States Constitution grants to the federal judiciary
power over all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.6 This
provision was implemented in the 1789 Judiciary Act by a congressional grant of "exclusive original cognizance of all civil causes of
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction" to the district courts. 7 In
interpreting the scope of this general constitutional grant of power,
the Supreme Court has asserted that determination of the limits
of maritime law and admiralty jurisdiction is exclusively a judicial
question.' With respect to factors to be considered in ascertaining
the scope of maritime law, the Court has suggested four major
considerations: (1) maritime law as derived from foreign codes and
usages; (2) United States legal history and Constitution; (3) legislation passed by Congress; and (4) United States legal practices
5. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
6. U.S. CONST. art. 3, § 2.
7. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 77. The constitutional grant of
jurisdiction over admiralty matters to the federal courts was qualified in the

Judiciary Act of 1789 by the "saving to suitors" clause granting the aggrieved
party the right to bring an action at common law where the common law courts
were competent to grant the requested remedy. Id. § 9(a). For an interesting

discussion of the historical and political origins of the saving clause see D. ROB(1970).
8. The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 558 (1875).
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and decisions. 9 Among the procedural elements of maritime law
acquired from foreign codes and usages, the "ancient and unique
remedy" of maritime attachment is the most powerful and distinctive.10 The first Supreme Court recognition of the legitimacy of
maritime attachment came in Justice Johnson's opinion in Manro
v. Almeida." In Manro defendant had contested the use of a writ
of attachment issued by the court clerk to plaintiff as being contrary to common law practice. In overturning the trial court's decision in favor of defendant, Justice Johnson wrote:
Upon the whole, we are of the opinion, that for a maritime trespass
. . . the person injured may have his action in personam, and compel appearance by the process of attachment on the goods of the
trespasser, according to the forms of the civil law, as engrafted upon
the admiralty practice. And we think that it indispensible to the
purposes of justice, and the due exercise of the admiralty jurisdiction, that the remedy should be applied, even in cases where the
same goods may have been attachable under the process of foreign
attachment issuing from the common law courts."
The traditional maritime attachment procedure involved the filing
of a complaint by the defendant with the court and the issuance
of an order of arrest by the court to a marshall or his deputy
directing him to take the defendant into custody. If the defendant
could not be found by the marshall, any property belonging to him
might be attached by the court. The primary purpose of the attachment was to compel the appearance of the defendant. If the
defendant failed to appear within the time allotted by the procedural rules, however, the court would grant plaintiff relief based
on satisfaction of his claim by judicial sale of defendant's attached
property. 3 In 1825 the Court in Manro recognized a modification
of this procedure to the extent that the writ of attachment could
9. Id. at 576.
10. For a discussion of the divergent lines of development of United States and
British admiralty practice in the area of in personam jurisdiction and maritime
attachment see F. WISWALL, THE DEVELOPMENT OF ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION AND
PRACTICE SINCE 1800 (1970).

11. 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 206 (1825).
12. Id. at 215-16. Justice Johnson's decision is also significant in that it affirmed the practice of United States admiralty courts to exercise a much wider
scope of jurisdiction than was prevalent in England at the time, thereby freeing
United States admiralty practice and procedure from the narrow scope of English
admiralty practice. See also Justice Johnson's concurring opinion in Ramsay v.
Allegre, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 611, 640 (1827).
13.

F. WiSWALL, supra note 10, at 17.
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be issued simultaneously with the writ of arrest.'4 This modified
procedure was incorporated into the Admiralty Rules of 1844, 15 and
remained largely unchanged through subsequent revisions including the complete revision of the rules in 1920.16 In 1966 the unification of civil and admiralty procedure resulted in a major revision
of admiralty procedure. The traditional maritime remedy of attachment and garnishment, however, was preserved from the prior

rules with one important modification. Under the 1966 unification,
Supplemental Rule B(1) shifted from the marshall to the plaintiff

the burden of establishing that the defendant cannot be found in
the district." Under today's procedure in Supplemental Rule B(1),
the marshall is no longer required to conduct a search for defen-

dant within the jurisdiction and report to the court the results of
its search.' 8 The question of constitutional limitations on the nature and scope of admiralty jurisdiction has been the subject of few
judicial comments with little or no carryover of constitutional
standards of civil law into admiralty decisions. Several Supreme
Court decisions have noted that although Congress has extensive
power to alter, qualify or supplement admiralty law as experience
or changing conditions might require, this power is subject to con-

stitutionai limitations.'9 It is significant, however, that no court
has ever held an admiralty statute to be unconstitutional."0 Similarly, there are no major cases overturning a procedural rule or
14. 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 215 (1825).
15. ADMRALTY RULES OF PRACTICE 9, 44 U.S. (3 How.) ix, xi (1845).
16. ADMmALTv RULES OF PRACTICE, 254 U.S. 679 (1920).
17. FED. R. Civ. P. Supp. R. B, Note of Advisory Committee on Rules, Subdivision 1 (1970).

18. This change has been viewed as an adjustment of the rules to reflect in
fact what was taking place. J.W. Moore writes:
In reality, however, the Supplemental Rules probably do not change the
former practice since, in many of the more active maritime districts, the
writ of foreign attachment did issue as of course and the courts looked both
to the thoroughness of the information for service provided by the plaintiff
and the diligence of the marshall ... it appears that even under the former
practice the diligence of the plaintiff in securing information regarding the
whereabouts of the defendant was often accorded more weight than the
diligence of the marshal.
7 A. J. MOORE & A. PELAEZ, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, para. B.07 at B-301 (2d
ed. 1978).
19. See, e.g., United Stqtes v. Flores, 289 U.S. 137 (1932); Panama Ry. v.
Johnson, 264 U.S. 375 (1924); The Steamer St. Lawrence, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 522
(1861).
20. See American Bridge Co. v. The Gloria 0., 98 F. Supp. 71, 73 (E.D.N.Y.
1951).
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judicial decision in admiralty on constitutional grounds. A series
of recent decisions by the Supreme Court has upheld constitutional due process challenges to a number of state garnishment
statutes with provisions very similar to the maritime attachment
provisions of Supplemental Rule B(1). In Sniadach v. Family Finance Corporationof Bay View2 1and Bell v. Burson2 state statutes
allowing garnishment of property or termination of a state regulated interest without a prior hearing to determine the probable
validity of the claim were declared violative of due process. In
Fuentes v. Shevin13 the Court summed up its holdings in Sniadach
and Bell by saying:
[I]t is now well settled that a temporary, nonfinal deprivation of
property is nonetheless a "deprivation" in terms of the Fourteenth
Amendment .... Both Sniadachand Bell involve takings of prop-

erty pending a final judgment in an underlying dispute. In both
cases, the challenged statutes included recovery provisions, allowing
the defendants to post security to quickly regain the property taken
from them. Yet the Court firmly held that these were deprivations
of property that had to be preceded by a fair hearing.24
Three exceptional circumstances were listed by the Court as extraordinary situations which have warranted postponing notice
and opportunity for a hearing, "First, in each case, the seizure has
been directly necessary to secure an important governmental or
general public interest. Second, there has been a special need for
very prompt action. Third, . . . the person initiating the seizure

has been a government official responsible for determining . . .
that it was necessary and justified in the particular instance." ' In
Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co.2" the Court withdrew somewhat from
its position in Shevin which appeared to mandate a preattachment hearing in all except the aforementioned special circumstances. 27 In Mitchell the Court upheld a Louisiana sequestration statute which did not provide for a pre-sequestration hearing.
The Court cited the requirement that plaintiff establish his interest in the property before a judge and that a writ could be issued
only by a judge after the posting of a bond sufficient to protect the
21. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
22. 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
23. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
24. Id. at 84-85.
25. Id. at 91.
26. 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
27. Justice Powell's concurring opinion argues that Mitchell overrules
Fuentes. Id. at 623 (Powell, J., concurring).

806

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

IVol. 11:801

debtor from damages in the event of mistaken deprivation. The
Louisiana statute provided further protection in that defendant
had the right after attachment to seek immediate dissolution of the
writ. It was necessary for the creditor then to prove, in a hearing,
the grounds upon which the writ was issued to prevent its dissolution."0 Some of the ambiguities regarding the status of Fuentes

following Mitchell were resolved when the Supreme Court in North
GeorgiaFinishing v. Di-Chem29 overturned a Georgia garnishment
statute on the ground that it failed to protect against a mistaken
deprivation of property. The Court described the procedure under
the Georgia statute as follows:
The writ of garnishment is issuable on the affidavit of the creditor
or his attorney, and the latter need not have personal knowledge of
the facts. [footnote omitted] The affidavit ... need contain only
conclusory allegations. The writ is issuable. . . by the court clerk,
There is no provision for an
without participation by a judge ....

to demonearly hearing at which the creditor would be required
3
strate at least probable cause for the garnishment. 1
In addition to the questions regarding the procedural legitimacy of
Supplemental Rule B(1) raised by the Sniadach line of cases, the
Supreme Court's decision in Shaffer v. Heitner3 ' raises doubts as
to the constitutional viability of maritime attachment in the face
of a substantive due process attack. In Shaffer the Court invalidated a Delaware statute which allowed state courts to take jurisdiction of a lawsuit by sequestering in-state property of a nonresident
defendant on the ground that, absent a finding of compelling state
interest in the procedure, the state must establish minimum contacts among the parties, the contested transaction, and the forum
state before jurisdiction can be exercised.32 The standards applied
by the Court in evaluating the Delaware sequestration statute were
the standards of fairness and substantial justice set forth in
InternationalShoe. 3
28. Id. at 618.

29. 419 U.S. 601 (1975).
30. Id. at 607.

31. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
For a discussion of Shaffer v. Heitner, see Recent Decisions, 11 VAND. J.
159 (1978).
33. 433 U.S. 186, 207 (1977). See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326
U.S. 310 (1945).
32.

TRANSNAT'L L.
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III. THE INSTANT OPINION
In the instant case the court faced substantive and procedural
due process challenges to its jurisdiction as a result of defendant's
claim that both the remedy and procedure prescribed in Rule B(1)
violated the due process clause of the fifth amendment." The court
first dealt with the substantive challenge and rejected defendant's
assertion that the Supreme Court holding in Shaffer v. Heitner5
required the district court to adopt the minimum contacts standard as a basis for the exercise of in personam jurisdiction in maritime attachment cases involving nonresident defendants. The
court noted that the constitutional grant of judicial power conferred jurisdiction over admiralty and maritime matters independent of jurisdiction over law and equity matters. 6 It further noted
that this independence was maintained by Congress in the Judiciary Act of 1789 and has been reaffirmed by the Supeme Court.31
Building upon the constitutional distinctiveness of admiralty jurisprudence, the court traced maritime attachment from its recognition in Manro v. Almeida38 to the present and concluded:
"[M]aritime attachment is constitutionally permissible. The recognized autonomy of admiralty jurisprudence, although not absolute, and the long constitutional viability of maritime attachment
compel me to conclude that Shaffer does not reach Rule B(1) at34.

450 F. Supp. 447, 449 (W.D. Wash. 1977). Defendant made no claim that

plaintiff failed to follow the procedures laid down in Supplemental Rule B(1).
Thus, the court was presented with the threshold problem of ascertaining whether
it had the power to declare a rule properly promulgated by the Supreme Court
unconstitutional. The district court argued that the Supreme Court acts only in
an administrative and not a judicial capacity when promulgating procedural rules
and from this distinction established the ground for conducting an inquiry into
the constitutionality of Rule B(1).
35. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
36. 450 F. Supp. 447, 453 (W.D. Wash. 1977).
37. Id. at 453. The Court cited the following passage from Romero v. International Terminal Operation Co.:
Of course all cases to which "judicial power" extends "arise," in a comprehensive, non-jurisdictional sense of the term "under this Constitution." It
is the Constitution that is the ultimate source of all "judicial
power"-defimes grants and implies limits-and so "all Cases of admiralty
and maritime Jurisdiction "arise under the Constitution in the sense that
they have constitutional sanction. But they are not "Cases, in Law and
Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United
States. ..."

358 U.S. 354, 368 (1959).
38. 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 206 (1825).

808

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

/Vol.

11:801

tachment. '" ' Analytically, the court distinguished the instant case
from Shaffer on grounds that maritime attachment does not rest
on the common law precedents which Shaffer overruled," and on
the modern trend in admiralty, contrary to common law, which
has been to strengthen traditional remedies.4 ' After deciding in
favor of the constitutional validity of maritime in personam attachment, the court addressed defendant's second claim that Supplemental Rule B(1) violates procedural due process by failing to
provide defendant sufficient protection against mistaken deprivation of property. The court examined the procedural elements of
Rule B(1) and noted that the writ of attachment was issued by the
clerk of the court as a matter of course solely on the basis of a
complaint and affidavit asserting that defendants could not be
found within the district. The court expressed concern that these
documents were verified only by plaintiffs counsel (as provided for
under the Rule) who apparently had no actual knowledge of the
events set forth in the complaint. Finally, the court noted that
there was no provision for an immediate post-seizure hearing. The
court considered this procedure in light of the Di-Chem decision
and concluded that the only meaningful distinction between DiChem and this action which might justify the Rule B(1) procedure
was that this action was in admiralty.2 The court, in finding that
the instant case involved only private interests, rejected plaintiff's
argument that the nature of admiralty practice is such that it
satisfies the "extraordinary situations" exception to the preattachment hearing and notice requirements of Fuentes v.
Shevin.43 The court further found plaintiff's contention that the
procedure under B(1) satisfies Mitchell v. W.T. Grant "without
merit," citing the fact that the Louisiana statute required "a clear
showing to a judge that the creditor had a right to possession;
conclusory allegations of ownership would not suffice."44 The court
also noted that the Louisiana debtor was protected by the requirement that plaintiff file a bond to cover all damages to debtor if the
deprivation of property proved to be mistaken, and that the debtor
39. 450 F. Supp. 447, 455 (W.D. Wash. 1977) (footnotes omitted.)
40. Shaffer overruled Pennoyerv. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877), the traditional preminimum contacts precedent for exercise of in rem jurisdiction.
41. 450 F. Supp. 447, 456 (W.D. Wash. 1977).
42. Id. at 456.
43. Id. at 457. In view of the failure of the plaintiff's case to satisfy the governmental purpose requirement the court considered it unnecessary for it to consider
the other two prongs of the Fuentes test.
44. Id. at 458.
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was entitled to an immediate post-seizure hearing to determine the
merits of creditor's claim against the attached property. None of
these protections were found to be available in rule B(1). The court
next considered whether a balancing of interests could justify the
summary procedure implicit in Rule B(1). The court concluded
that it did not, stating, "The vitality of maritime commerce depends as much on the availability of protections against the mistaken summary deprivation of property of maritime defendants as
it does on the availability of speedy remedies for maritime plain-

tiffs.

'45

Plaintiff finally contended that Rule B(1) satisfies due

process because it was the same procedure employed when the
Constitution was adopted. The court rejected this argument finding little resemblance between the present attachment procedure
and that in existence when the Constitution was adopted. In support of its position the court pointed out that prior to Manro "a
writ of maritime attachment was issued only after the marshal or
his deputy had returned a warrant of arrest in personam that the
defendant could not be found within the district." 6 Even after
Manro, according to the court, and until 1844 when Admiralty
Rule 2 was promulgated, maritime defendants had greater procedural protection47 than that offered by Rule B(1), since judicial
participation was required in the attachment procedure. Because
the court found no indication that maritime defendants may be
due less procedural protection against the mistaken deprivation of
property than non-maritime defendants, it concluded that based
on Fuentes and Di-Chem Rule B(1) was unconstitutional."
IV.

COMMENT

The instant opinion represents a practical middle ground in an
important legal area which has received little academic or judicial
consideration.49 Against the danger of abuse of rules designed to
45. Id.
46. Id. at 459 (quoting from the decision in Maryland Tuna Corp. v. M/S
Benares, 429 F.2d 307, 320 (2d Cir. 1970)).
47. 450 F. Supp. 447, 458 (W.D. Wash. 1977).
48. Id. at 459, 460.
49. Even the question whether it is Congress or the courts which is supreme
in defining the scope of admiralty jurisdiction remains unclear. An indication of
the logical inconsistencies which appear in opinions in this area is exemplified by
Chief Justice Hughes' opinion in Detroit Trust Co. v. The Thomas Barlum, in
which he wrote, "[Congress] has paramount power to determine the maritime
law which shall prevail throughout the country . . . . But in amending and
revising the maritime law, the Congress necessarily acts within a sphere restricted
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enhance "the safety and convenience of commerce and the speedy
decision of controversies, where delay would often be ruin,"5 the
court must balance the consideration that:
To compel suitors in admiralty (when the ship is abroad and cannot
be reached by a libel in rem) to resort to the home of the defendant,
and to prevent them from suing him in any district in which he
might be served with a summons or his goods or credits attached,
would not only often put them to great delay, inconvenience and
expense, but would in many cases amount to a denial of justice.',
The necessity of maintaining "certain distinctive maritime remedies" was recognized by the Advisory, Committee which drafted
the Unified Rules of Civil and Admiralty Procedure adopted in
1966.2 An extension of Shaffer v. Heitner into maritime attachment would have had serious repercussions on the conduct of
United States and international maritime commerce. As the instant case demonstrates, foreign as well as domestic parties rely on
the availability of judicial maritime attachment remedies which
can be found worldwide in coastal states engaged in maritime
trade. The court's arguments in favor of the historical and constitutional separateness of admiralty law are also persuasive. Although the constitutional uniqueness of admiralty law has never
been clearly defined by the Supreme Court, it must extend to
traditional remedies which are essential to the continued vitality
of admiralty jurisprudence. Therefore, the court's decision to affirm the validity of maritime attachment can be supported on the
grounds of equity and fairness to the parties involved, commercial
by the concept of the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction." 293 U.S. 21, 43-44
(1934). One commentator has noted that this "subservient paramountcy may

offer inviting fields for theological speculation [but] it will not draw much applause for jurisprudential certainty." Zobel, Admiralty Jurisdiction,Unification,
and The American Law Institute, 6 SAN DINGo L. REV. 385 (1969).
50. The Genesee Chief, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 233, 454 (1851).
51. In re Louisville Underwriters, 134 U.S. 488, 493 (1890).
52. The Committee wrote in their introductory note to Rule B:
Certain distinctively maritime remedies must be preserved in unified
rules. The commencement of an action by attachment or garnishment has
heretofore been practically unknown in federal jurisprudence except in
admiralty ....

No attempt is here made to compile a complete and self-contained code
governing these distinctly maritime remedies. The more limited objective

is to carry forward the relevant provisions of the former Rules of Practice
for Admiralty and Maritime Cases, modernized and revised to some extent

but still in the context of history and precedent.
7A MOORE's FEDERAL PRACriCE, supra note 16, para. A.01(2) at 513.
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realism, and the constitutional uniqueness of admiralty jurisprudence. The court also goes beyond a simple affirmation of maritime
attachment to examine the procedure of attachment.5 3 The court
convincingly demonstrates that there is neither historical nor judicial precedent to support the procedure in Supplemental Rule
B(1). Likewise, there is no vested constitutional interest in the
procedure employed in Rule B(1). Thus, commercial necessity and
fundamental fairness to the parties remain the only factors to be
considered in assessing the validity of Rule B(1). The court, however, chooses to treat this question as a conventional procedural
due process question without expressly taking into consideration
the unique commercial context which largely dictates the constitu-

tional separateness of admiralty law. In the instant case, it is clear
that the unique demands of maritime commerce for expeditious
means of either insuring defendant's presence in court or satisfying
valid claims cannot outweigh the defendant's interest in sufficient
procedures providing a reasonable protection against mistaken
deprivation of property. 4 The short-term impact of the district
court's decision will be beneficial. Procedural protections under
Rule B(1) are clearly inadequate, and this decision should stimulate courts to take appropriate steps under Rule 83 to make local

rules which are not inconsistent with Rule B(1), but which provide
greater protection to the defendant. 5 The long-term benefits of
53. A discussion of the propriety of a district court declaring Rules promulgated by the Supreme Court unconstitutional is beyond the scope of this comment. However, the risks and problems associated with various district courts
applying different constitutional standards to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are obvious.
54. In keeping with the constitutional uniqueness of admiralty law, arguably
it was inappropriate for the court to cite Fuentes v. Shevin and North Georgia
Finishing v. Di-Chem as controlling precedent in deciding the procedural due
process question. Certainly their arguments could be cited as persuasive but their
holdings should not be binding on admiralty merely because the factual patterns
are similar or even identical.
55. Rule 83 provides that:
Each district court,by action of a majority of the judges thereof may from
time to time make and amend rules governing its practice not inconsistent
with these rules. Copies of rules and amendments so made by any district
court shall upon their promulgation be furnished to the Supreme Court of
the United States. In all cases not provided for by rule, the district courts
may regulate their practice in any manner not inconsistent with these rules.
FED. R. CIv. P. 83. One procedural improvement which could be adopted quite
readily under Rule 83 would be to allow defendant the right to seek immediate
dissolution of the writ of attachment. See, e.g., Mitchell v. W.T. Grant, 416 U.S.
337 (1969).
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this decision are not as clear. The issues raised by the decision,
however, may serve to stimulate a long overdue discussion of the
constitutional parameters of admiralty jurisprudence.
Aubrey W. Bogle, HI

BUY AMERICAN STATUTES-NEw JERSEYCONSTITUTIONALITY OF BuY AMERICAN STATUTE UPHELD BY STATE
SUPREME COURT

I.

FACTS AND HOLDING

Defendant, the North Jersey District Water Supply Commission, issued bidding specifications to contractors for the construction of a water treatment plant. The specifications contained pro-

visions' requiring compliance with the New Jersey Buy American
statute. 2 Generally, the Buy American statute requires exclusive
use of domestic materials and supplies in public work projects and
in any work for which the state pays part of the cost. 3 Failure to
comply with these requirements results in the contractor's being
barred from consideration for public work contracts for a period of
three years. 4 Plaintiffs, an individual taxpayer and private resident

of New Jersey,5 and a New York subsidiary of a West German
manufacturer of pumping equipment,6 sought a declaration that
1. An addendum to the original specifications contained the first mention of
specifications requiring compliance with the Buy American statute.
2. N.J. STAT. ANN §§ 52:33-2 & 3 (West 1955).
3. The requirement is, however, flexible. "[Ihf the head of the department
or other public officer authorized by law to make the contract shall find that in
respect to some particular domestic materials it is impracticable to make such
requirement or that it would unreasonably increase the cost, an exception shall
be noted in the specifications as to that particular material, and a public record
made of the findings which justified the exception." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:33-3
(West 1955).
4. Id. § 52:33-4.
5. Sieglinde Fazio is a property owner, taxpayer and resident of the City of
Clifton, New Jersey, a municipality serviced by the Commission. The trial court
held that she had sufficient standing to bring the present suit. K.S.B. Technical
Sales Corp. v. North Jersey Water Supply Commission of the State of New Jersey,
150 N.J. Super. 533, 376 A.2d 203 (1977). The instant court expressly concurred
with the trial court's holding on the issue, reasoning that Fazio "as a taxpayer
residing in a municipality . . .of the North Jersey District, has a pecuniary

interest in the project." K.S.B. Technical Sales Corp. v. North Jersey Water
Supply Comm'n, 75 N.J. 272, 381 A.2d 774, 777 (1977).
6. K.S.B. Technical Sales Corp. (KSB), a New York corporation which imports and distributes water-pumping equipment of the type required under the
specifications issued by the Commission, is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Klein
Schonzlin Becker AG, a West German manufacturer of pumps and pumping
equipment. KSB had obtained the original bidding invitation from the Commission which did not include the Buy American provision. See note 1 supra. Seven
days after the addendum containing the Buy American provision was issued,
KSB instituted an action against the Commission in the United States District
Court for the District of New Jersey. The federal district court appointed a con-
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the Buy American condition in the specifications was invalid and
that the statute was unconstitutional. Plaintiffs attacked the statute in three ways, arguing: (1) that the Buy American statute
impaired and was inconsistent with the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT);7 (2) that it represented an impermissible conflict with the foreign affairs power of Congress and the
President; and (3) that it violated the commerce clause.8 The trial
court declared the Buy American provisions in the specifications
invalid, but held that in fairness the bids submitted in accordance
therewith should stand.' The Appellate Division affirmed with respect to the invalidity of the Buy American condition, but reversed
in part, holding that the bids submitted under the specifications
were void."0 On appeal to the Supreme Court of New Jersey,
reversed. Held: The New Jersey Buy American statute is neither
servator to collect the bids for the Commission and hold them unopened until
further order of the court.
The trial court found that KSB had standing to bring this suit since the Buy
American provision deprived it of the opportunity to offer its pumps to prospective bidders. 150 N.J. Super. at 542, 376 A.2d at 208. But the instant court noted
that there was no clear showing that any bidder would have considered the pumps
sold by KSB in making its bid. 75 N.J. 272, 381 A.2d at 777. The court, however,
did not find it necessary to pass on the issue since it had been held that Faxio
possessed a clear right to standing. Id.
7. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), a multilateral international agreement made by executive action, is designed to remove impediments
to international trade between the signatories. It is considered the "principal"
means of regulating international trade. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,
Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A23, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter cited
as GATT]; see Jackson, The GeneralAgreement on Tariffs and Trade in United
States Domestic Law, 66 MICH. L. REv. 249 (1967).
GATT has been equated with treaty law on several occasions. See United
States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324
(1937). Plaintiffs felt the Buy American statute constituted an impediment to
international trade, and since GATT is in effect federal law, that the Buy American statute should be preempted under the supremacy clause. U.S. CONsT. art.
VI, cl. 2.
8. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
9. The trial court held that the Buy American provision conflicted with GATT
and thus violated the supremacy clause. The court found, however, no commerce
clause violation. 150 N.J. Super. at 548, 376 A.2d at 211.
10. 151 N.J. Super. 218, 376 A.2d 960, 964, 966 (1977). Following the trial
court's opinion, the Appellate Division also found no intrusion by the statute into
the commerce clause powers reserved to Congress. Id., 376 A.2d at 962. On the
issue of the validity of the bids, however, the court held that when positive
constitutional prohibitions exist, a court of equity is not free to disregard them,
citing Hedges v. Dixon City, 150 U.S. 182 (1893). 376 A.2d at 966. The court
thereupon directed the conservator to return the bids unopened.
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preempted by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, nor an
encroachment upon the federal foreign affairs or commerce powers,
and is therefore constitutional. K.S.B. Technical Sales Corp. v.
North Jersey District Water Supply Commission, 75 N.J. 272, 381
A.2d 774 (1977), appeal dismissed,

-

U.S.

-,

98 S.Ct. 1635

(1978).
If.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

The supremacy clause" provides that the Constitution, treaties,
and federal legislation are to be considered the "supreme law of the
land."' 12 In some situations state laws must be held unconstitutional, even though the federal government has not expressly
preempted the particular field and regardless of whether the state
action is harmonious with federal policies.' 3 Thus, congressional
intent to preempt state action in a particular field exists impliedly
where the nature of regulated subject matter "permits no other
conclusion."' 4 Where the entire field has not been preempted, however, coexistence of federal and state regulations is possible. This
coexistence depends upon "whether both

. . .

regulations can be

enforced without impairing the federal superintendence of the
field, not [on] whether they are aimed at similar or different
objectives."' 5 Following this rule, the Supreme Court in DeCanas
v. Bica'8 upheld a state regulation'7 prohibiting employers from
knowingly employing aliens not entitled to lawful residence in the
United States, if such employment had an adverse effect on lawful
resident workers. The Court reasoned that because the regulation
had only "purely speculative and indirect impact on immigration," ,8 it was not preempted by the federal government's exclusive
power to regulate immigration. A state law must yield, however,
if it impairs an attempt by the federal government to regulate a
field through either treaty law'9 or congressional action." Thus, in
11. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
12. Id.
13. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. 424 U.S. 351 (1976).
17. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2805(a) (West Supp. 1978).
18. 424 U.S. at 355.
19. Kolovarat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 190 (1961); United States v. Pink, 315
U.S. 203, 230 (1942).
20. Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971); Lee v. Florida, 392 U.S. 378
(1968); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
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Kolovarat v. Oregon,21 a state statute providing that intestate
property be escheated to. the state when decedent leaves no next
of kin except aliens living outside the United States, was held
preempted by a treaty with Serbia (now Yugoslavia). The treaty
allowed citizens of that country to inherit personal property located in the United States on the same basis as United States
citizens. Although entered into by executive agreement, GATT is
considered legally equivalent to treaties enacted under congressional initiative. 22 Thus, several state laws have been declared in2
2
valid because of inconsistency with GATT. In Territory v. Ho,
for instance, a Hawaiian territorial law requiring retailers selling
imported eggs to advertise openly that the eggs were imported was
struck down as unconstitutional and contrary to federal agreement. Although the Constitution contains no such specific grant,
it has been held that the power to regulate foreign affairs is re2
served to Congress and the President.2 In United States v. Pink,
the Supreme Court held that the power over external affairs was
not shared by the states, but was vested in the national government exclusively. 27 The Supreme Court in Zschernig v. Miller2
struck down an Oregon statute which, in its opinion, required probate courts to make value judgments regarding the governments
of other nations before allowing citizens of those countries to take
21. 366 U.S. 187.
22. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942); United States v. Belmont, 301
U.S. 324 (1937); see also Jackson, note 7 supra.
23. Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp. v. Superior Court, 208 Cal. App. 2d 803,
25 Cal. Rptr. 798 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962); Territory v. Ho, 41 Haw. 565 (1957).
24. Territory v. Ho, 41 Haw. at 568 (citing United States v. Belmont and
United States v. Pink).
25. Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 57 (1958); United States v. Curtiss-Wright
Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936). In Curtis-Wright, the Court recognized that
Congress as well as the President possessed the power to regulate foreign affairs,
stating that "the investment of the federal government with the powers of external sovereignty did not depend upon the affirmative grants of the Constitution."
299 U.S. at 318. The Court stated further, however, that the demands of national
sovereignty require that "the President alone [possesses] the power to speak or
listen as a representative of the nation. He makes treaties with the advice and
consent of the Senate; but he alone negotiates." Id. at 319.
26. 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
27. Id. at 233. Similarly, in Chae Chan Ping v. United States (Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581 (1889), the Court stated that "[flor local interests the
several States of the Union exist, but for national purposes, embracing our relations with foreign nations, we are but one people, one nation, one power." 130 U.S.
at 606.
28. 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
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possession of property willed them by Oregon residents. Although
the Oregon law had no effect outside the state, the Court felt it
"inescapable" that such laws would affect "international relations
in a persistent and subtle way."2 This undesirable result would not
necessarily stem from the law's substantive requirements or prohibitions, but rather from the general harm to foreign relations which
would result if each state were allowed to establish its own foreign
policy. 0 Relying on Zschernig, the Supreme Court of New Jersey,
in In re Estate of Kish,3 ruled that in order to avoid interference
with federal foreign policy, New Jersey state courts should not
predicate decisions on comparisons of political, social, or economic
systems.
The commerce clause of the Constitution empowers Congress
"to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several
states ....
"32 Even though the clause authorizes only Congress
to act, a residue of power remains in the states to enact legislation
affecting commerce, absent a finding that Congress has preempted
the particular field. 3 Although Supreme Court cases in this area
have traditionally involved state regulation of commercial activity
in the private sector," cases testing the validity of state laws that
regulate the manner in which private contractors carry out public
work contracts have arisen. For example, in Heim v. McCall,3 the
Court sustained a New York statute requiring that only United
State citizens be employed on public work projects in that state.
In a more recent decision, American Yearbook Co. v. Askew, " a
state statute requiring all public printing for the State of Florida
29. Id. at 440. The Court continued. "Where those laws conflict with a treaty,
they must bow to the superior federal policy. Yet, even in absence of a treaty, a
State's policy may disturb foreign relations." Id. at 441.
30. Id. at 441.
31. 52 N.J. 454, 246 A.2d 1 (1968). The court held that in a proceeding brought
by foreign beneficiaries under a will, the beneficiaries should be permitted to take
control of their shares absent a federal prohibition against transmission of private
funds to that particular nation.
32. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
33. Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945); Cooley v. Board of
Wardens, 52 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1852).
34. Hale v. Bimco Trading, Inc., 306 U.S. 375 (1939); Baldwin v. G.A.F.
Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1934). Review of this type of state legislation calls for
a balancing between the public interest served by the law or regulation against
the extent of the burden placed upon the affected party, and the availability of
alternatives to the law in question. A. & P. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366
(1976); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
35. 239 U.S. 175 (1915).
36. 339 F. Supp. 719 (M.D. Fla. 1972). aff'd mem., 409 U.S. 904 (1972).
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to be done within the state was held not to violate the commerce
clause. Finally, in Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp.,37 the Court
upheld a Maryland statute which, in distinguishing between instate and foreign scrap metal processors, arguably discriminated
in favor of the former. The Court stated that "[n]othing in the
purposes animating the Commerce Clause prohibits a State, in the
absence of congressional action, from participating in the market
and exercising the right to favor its own citizens over others. "18 In
Garden State Dairies of Vineland, Inc. v. Sills,3 the Supreme
Court of New Jersey upheld a similar statute which required governmental purchasers of milk to obtain from the seller a certification that he would purchase an equal amount of fresh milk from
New Jersey producers. The court pointed out that any private
purchaser of milk could confine his purchases to New Jersey milk,
or milk from dealers who sell equivalent quantities of New Jersey
milk." The court asked whether the state, as a buyer in the marketplace, should not have the same right." Although the New Jersey Buy American statute had not been directly challenged prior
to the instant action, in California a similar act4 had twice been
successfully attacked. In the first of these cases, Baldwin-LimaHamilton Corp. v. Superior Court,43 a California district court of
appeal held that the California Buy American Act was unenforceable in the particular situation then before the court because it
conflicted with the GATT. The court did not, however, conclude
that the act itself was unconstitutional. In a more recent case,
Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Board of Commissioners,44 however, the
Act was declared unconstitutional. The California Buy American
0

37. 426 U.S. 794 (1976). The purpose of the statute was to protect the state's
environment by encouraging the removal of abandoned automobiles from Mary-

land streets and junkyards.
38. 426 U.S. at 810.
39. 46 N.J. 349, 217 A.2d 126 (1966).
40, Id. at 353, 217 A.2d at 128.

41. Id. Garden State was cited by Mr. Justice Brennan's dissent in Hughes
v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794. He felt the Court in Hughes had abandoned completely the commerce clause doctrine in dealing with the Maryland
statute, whereas the New Jersey Supreme Court in GardenState had refused an
invitation to "forego all Commerce Clause analysis merely because the State
[was] acting in a proprietary purchasing capacity in implementing its discriminatory policies." 426 U.S. at 823.
42. CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 4300-4305 (West 1966); see Usher, Buy American
Policy: Conflict with GATT and the Constitution, 17 STAN. L. REv. 119 (1964).
43. 208 Cal. App. 2d 803, 25 Cal. Rptr. 798 (Ct. App. 1962).
44. 276 Cal. App. 2d 221, 80 Cal. Rptr. 800 (Ct. App. 1969).
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Act required that contracts for public construction or for the purchase of materials for state use be awarded only to those agreeing
to use or supply only materials manufactured in the United States
while fulfilling the contracts. Although similar in most respects to
the New Jersey Buy American statute, the California Act was more
inflexible in its application. Whereas the New Jersey statute allows
public officers some discretion in enforcing the statute's requirements, the only exemptions to the California Act were in regard
to purchases of particular types of material. 5 Without addressing
whether the California Buy American Act was in conflict with the
GATT or whether the Act intruded upon the commerce clause
powers reserved to Congress, the court concluded that the Act was
"an unconstitutional encroachment upon the federal government's
exclusive power over foreign affairs, and constituted an undue interference with the United States' conduct of foreign relations."'"
The court reasoned that the California Act amounted to a usurpation by the state of the federal government's power to regulate
foreign trade policy.47 In the instant case, the New Jersey Buy
American statute was confronted with essentially the same challenge as was the California Act.

III.

THE INSTANT OPMON

Although recognizing that the New Jersey Buy American statute
appears inconsistent with GATT,4" the instant court nevertheless
held that no impermissible conflicts existed between the two, and
accordingly, that GAIT1 did not preempt the New Jersey statute.
The court determined that the materials needed by the Commission for the construction of the water treatment plant would fall
within an express exemption to the treaty,"6 which excludes from
coverage products which are purchased by governmental agencies
for governmental purposes and which are not intended to be resold
45. See 276 Cal. App. 2d at 227 n.9, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 804 n.9.
46. Id. at 224, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 802.
47. Id. at 225, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 803.
48. The court singled out GATT, supra note 7, art. 11 (2) as directly conflicting with the Buy American statute. The paragraph provides that products of any

signatory to GATT, imported into the territory of another signatory, should "be
accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like products of
national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and requirements affecting their
internal sale . ..

."

49. "The provisions of this Article shall not apply to the procurement by
governmental agencies of products purchased for governmental purposes and not
for resale or use in the production of goods for sale .

. .

. " Id. art. Ir(5).
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or used in the production of goods for commercial sale. After a
comprehensive examination of the structure and functions of the
Commission, the court concluded that the Commission's purchases of materials and equipment for construction of the water
treatment plant were for a legitimate public purpose. The court
found it unnecessary, however, to pass on whether the water
"produced" by the Commission should be considered "goods" for
commercial sale since it was clear to the court that the Commission had acted for governmental purposes and not because of any
commercial motive 0 In ruling that the Buy American statute did
not encroach upon the federal government's foreign affairs powers,
the court reasoned that, since application of the statute does not
require state officials to evaluate the economic and governmental
policies of other countries, it does not usurp the federal government's function of formulating foreign policy. The court stated in
dicta that if "refined inquiries into foreign ideologies"5 entered
into the decision to apply the Buy American statute, there would
have been "little difficulty,

52

in light of Zschernig v. Miller,,3 in

concluding that the statute was unconstitutional. In a footnote,5"
the court impled that, since in their view the Buy American statute
is consistent with federal policy, the Zschernig case would not
present a problem regarding the validity of the statute. The court
distinguished Bethlehem Steel55 by contrasting the California and
New Jersey statutes. The court felt that the New Jersey statute
had a more limited impact and a more restricted sphere than the
California Act because of its provision giving state officials the
discretion not to apply the Buy American requirements. 5 The
court noted, moreover, that the California court had failed to consider the express exemption to GATT into which it believed both
statutes fell."7 Citing DeCanas v. Bica,5 the court concluded by
asserting that not every state statute touching upon foreign affairs
50. 75 N.J. 272, 381 A.2d at 792. The court reasoned that since one Commissibn operates at cost and since potable water is a necessity upon which the very
existence of the inhabitants of the northern water supply district depends, the
Commission's activities in providing the water to the northern district constitute
governmental functions.
51. 75 N.J. 272, 381 A.2d at 784.

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id.
389 U.S. 429.
75 N.J. 272, 381 A.2d at 784 n.6.
276 Cal. App. 2d 21, 80 Cal. Rptr. 800.
See note 3 supra.
See note 49 supra.
424 U.S. 351.

Fall 1978]

RECENT DECISIONS

is invalid, but only those statutes which "result demonstrably in
a significant and direct impact upon foreign affairs."59 In approaching the commerce clause question, the court first distinguished state regulation of the commercial affairs of others from a
state's regulation of its own entry into the marketplace. The court
noted that commerce which is "burdened" by such self-regulation
would not even exist but for the state's willing entry into the marketplace. Relying on Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp.0 and
American Yearbook Co. v. Askew,"1 the court held that in the
absence of conflicting federal action, state legislation relating to
the state's purchase of goods and materials is not subject to the
usual commerce clause restrictions. 2 The court therefore concluded that the New Jersey Buy American statute in no way violated the commerce clause.
IV.

COMMENT

The instant decision, aside from its obvious effect on public
works contracts in New Jersey,63 is of national significance. The
political forces which prompted the passage of the New Jersey Buy
American statute were not unique to that state. The federal government" and several of the states 5 have passed legislation with
similar restrictions on governmental purchasing of foreign goods
and materials. Criticism of these statutes has been extensive. 6 The
criticism of the Federal Buy American Act has centered on the
apparent conflict between the protectionist policies of the Act and
the professed international trade policies of the United States. For
decades the United States has espoused the reduction and elimination of restrictions on international trade." The most visible evidence of this attitude is GATT. As the instant court recognized,
59.
60.

75 N.J. 272, 381 A.2d at 784.
426 U.S. 794.

61. 339 F. Supp. 719.
62. 75 N.J. 272, 381 A.2d at 787.
63. The effects which the statute will have upon commerce in New Jersey are
two-sided. First, every contractor with the state will, of course, be forced to
confime itself to American-made materials. Second, the Buy American statute
will make it very difficult for foreign corporations to do business at all with the
State of New Jersey.
64. Buy American Act, 41 U.S.C. § 10a-d (1976).
65. See generally Berliner, State "Buy American" Policies-OneVice, Many
Voices, 32 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 584, 585 (1964).
66. See, e.g., id.; Knapp, The Buy American Act: A Review and Assessment,
61 COLUM. L. REV. 430 (1961).
67. See Knapp, note 66 supra.
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however, GATT seems inconsistent with all Buy American legislation. But the conflict is deeper than the inconsistency between
GATT and Buy American legislation. The dispute has an economic, and thus political, basis. Since this political battle is of an
economic nature, it is not likely to dissipate with time. The political momentum seems to have swung, moreover, toward protectionism, especially at the state level. 8 The overturning of the California Buy American Act 9 on constitutional grounds in Bethlehem
Steel, however, provided the opponents of such legislation with an
alternative to political battle in that the case represents strong
legal authority against such statutes. The instant decision, however, blunts the effectiveness of Bethlehem Steel by establishing
contrary judicial precedent. The New Jersey court, moreover, went
beyond simply creating a balance of authority. By carefully distinguishing the New Jersey statute from its California counterpart,
and by pointing out the California court's failure to consider the
"governmental purposes" exemption to GATT,70 the court seems
impliedly to have set up the New Jersey Buy American statute as
a model after which other states may pattern their legislation.
Edward H. Lueckenhoff
68. Evidence of this is seen in the number of states which have adopted
legislation similar to the New Jersey Buy American statute. See Berliner, note

65 supra.
69.
70.

See Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Board of Comm'rs, note 44 supra.
See note 49 supra.

CITIZENSHIP-THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT REQUIRES
PROOF BY CLEAR, CONVINCING, AD UNEQUIVOCAL EVIDENCE THAT
RELINQUISHMENT OF UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP IS VOLUNTARY
I.

FACTS AND HOLDING

Plaintiff, a dual national, brought suit against the Secretary of
State,' seeking issuance of a passport and a declaration of United
States citizenship. Plaintiff was born in the United States 2 where
his mother was a citizen. His father was, however, a Mexican citizen and plaintiff was, at birth, a citizen of both countries.3 The
State Department issued a Certificate of Loss of Nationality in
1971,1 after learning that the plaintiff had signed an oath of allegiance to Mexico and had obtained a Certificate of Mexican Nationality in order to graduate from a Mexican college. Plaintiff first
sought reinstatement of citizenship by an appearance before the
Board of Appellate Review of the Department of State, where he
contended that he had not voluntarily renounced citizenship' when
he signed the application form for a Certificate of Mexican Nationality.6 The Board affirmed the administrative finding of expatria1. Plaintiff's action was initiated pursuant to 8U.S.C. § 1503(a) (1976), which
allows a person who has been denied the right of citizenship by final administrative action to bring suit in district court against the head of the department for a
judgment declaring him to be a United States citizen.
2. Laurence J. Terrazas was born in Takoma Park, Maryland, on December
13, 1947.
3. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1. "[AIll persons born .. . in the United
States are citizens of the United States."
4. The Certificate was issued in accordance with 8 U.S.C. § 1501 (1976), which
directs any consular officer who has reason to believe that a person has lost his
citizenship to certify the facts upon which the belief is based. If the report is
approved by the Secretary of State, the Certificate of Loss of Nationality is sent
to the Attorney General and to the person to whom the certificate relates.
5. Plaintiff told a United States consular official in Monterey, Mexico, that
he had acquired a Certificate of Mexican Nationality, whereupon he was advised
that the acquisition of the Certificate was an act of expatriation. The official then
stated that he lacked authority to make a final determination and asked plaintiff
to fill out several forms explaining the circumstances. Except for one statement,
plaintiff's answers to the questions indicated that he did not intend to give up
his United States citizenship. It was not clear whether plaintiff understood at
that time he was making an application for Certificate of Loss of Nationality.
6. 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(2) (1976) provides: "From and after the effective date
of this chapter a person who is a national of the United States. . . shall lose his
nationality by taking an oath or making an affirmation or other formal declaration of allegiance to a foreign state or political subdivision thereof; or . .. ."
The application completed by the plaintiff was printed in Spanish and was
translated:
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tion and denied plaintiff's application for a United States passport. Plaintiff then instituted an action in district court. The court
ruled that a denial of plaintiff's passport application by reason of
expatriation was proper, applying the burden of proof standard set
out in 8 U.S.C. § 1481(c), which requires that the government
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that an individual has
voluntarily renounced citizenship. The court concluded that the
government had satisfied this burden. On appeal to the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals, reversed and remanded. Held: The fourteenth amendment requires the government to prove by clear, convincing, and unequivocal evidence that relinquishment of United
States citizenship is voluntary. Terrazas v. Vance, 577 F.2d 7 (7th
Cir. 1978).
II.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

Rusk,7 the

In Afroyim v.
Supreme Court held that the fourteenth
amendment protects every citizen from a congressional withdrawal
of his right of citizenship." An individual could not be deprived of
I therefore hereby expressly renounce

citizenship

as well as any submission, obedience and loyalty to my foreign government,
especially that of
of which I might have been subject,
all protection foreign to the laws of Mexico, all rights which treaties or
international law grant to foreigners: and furthermore I swear adherence,
obedience and submission to the laws and authorities of the Mexican Republic.
The blanks were filled in with the Spanish words for the English terms, "United
States" and "North America" respectively. Plaintiff claimed that when he signed
the application form the blanks were empty and he had no idea that he was
renouncing United States citizenship.
7. 387 U.S. 253 (1967). Afroyim, a naturalized American citizen, voted in an
Israeli election. The State Department refused to renew his passport, maintaining
that he had lost his citizenship by virtue of § 401(e) of the Nationality Act of 1940,
8 U.S.C. § 1481(a) (5) (1976), which provides that citizenship can be lost by voting
in a foreign election. Afroyim brought a declaratory judgment action alleging the
unconstitutionality of § 401(e).
8. 387 U.S. at 268. The court reached this conclusion by reviewing the legislative and judicial history of congressional power over citizenship matters. It relied
especially on Justice Marshall's pre-fourteenth amendment dictum in Osborn v.
Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 827 (1824), that legislative
powers over citizenship matters are limited to prescribing a uniform rule of naturalization. The court also relied on an 1898 Supreme Court opinion, United States
v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898), which declared that Congress could not
deny citizenship guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment to those born or naturalized in the United States. The court concluded from this history that the
language and purpose of the fourteenth amendment made it an absolute bar to
congressional interference.
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citizenship unless he voluntarily chose to relinquish it. Afroyim
expressly overruled an earlier decision in Perez v. Brownell, 1 where
the majority had ruled that Congress' implied power to regulate

foreign affairs" enabled it to strip United States nationals of citizenship for voting in foreign elections.1 2 Afroyim thus declared an
end to a long history of judicial deference to legislative determination of the problems of expatriation.1 3 At the same time, the decision created new difficulties for courts and administrators because

it did not define precisely "voluntary relinquishment" of citizenship or the quantum of proof necessary to show voluntary relin9. Although it has long been recognized that expatriation must be voluntary
to be effective, earlier decisions have held that proof of specific intent is not
required. See Cafiero v. Kennedy, 262 F. Supp. 140 (D.N.J. 1966). Baker v. Rusk,
296 F. Supp. 1244 (C.D. Cal. 1969), appeal dismissed by stipulation, applied a
preponderance of the evidence test, but is otherwise in accord with the broad
interpretation of Afroyim given by the instant court. Baker held that an individual could not lose his citizenship by merely taking an oath; the government must
prove that he voluntarily intended to renounce citizenship.
10. 356 U.S. 44 (1958). Perez was decided as a companion case to two other loss
of citizenship cases, Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958), and Nishikawa v. Dulles,
356 U.S. 129 (1958).
11. 356 U.S. at 57. Justice Frankfurter's majority opinion viewed the Nationality Act of 1940 as an exercise of the congressional power to regulate foreign
affairs. See generally United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304
(1936); Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299 (1915).
12. 356 U.S. at 58-59. Since Congress may not act arbitrarily the majority
found that "a rational nexus must exist between the content of a specific power
in Congress and the action of Congress in carrying that power into execution."
Specifically, withdrawal of citizenship must be related to regulation of foreign
affairs. The Court found that it was related because voting by United States
citizens might have caused embarrassment to the United States Government.
13. The attitude of the courts in the first half of this century was objective
and noninterventionist. If a citizen had performed one of the acts described by
Congress as an act of expatriation the courts held that the citizen had lost his
citizenship regardless of his intent or knowledge of the law. Ample authority for
Congress' power was found in the "necessary and proper clause" and the power
to regulate foreign affairs. See Savorgnan v. United States, 338 U.S. 491 (1950);
MacKenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299 (1915). Perez may be viewed as the final major
reaffirmation of this trend in judicial thinking. Its two companion cases,
Nishikawa and Trop, marked the beginning of a new trend toward limitation of
congressional expatriation powers. In two cases prior to Afroyim, Kennedy v.
Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963), and Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163
(1964), the Court moved to limit Congress' authority to expatriate citizens. This
trend culminated in Afroyim's absolute prohibition on congressional power to
involuntarily expatriate citizens. See Dionisopoulos, Afroyim v. Rusk: The Evolution, Uncertaintyand Implications of a ConstitutionalPrinciple,55 MINN. L. REV.

235 (1970).
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quishment.1 The most recent Supreme Court opinion on the standard of proof in expatriation cases came in Nishikawa v. Dulles,5
in which the majority declared that the burden is on the government to prove by clear, convincing, and unequivocal evidence that
an individual's renunciation of citizenship is voluntary." The court
based its decision not on the fourteenth amendment, but on the
belief that the consequences of loss of citizenship are so drastic
that a strict standard of proof should be applied.1 7 Congress did not
feel bound by this interpretation and amended 8 U.S.C. § 1481(c)
to place a presumption of voluntariness on any act of expatriation."8 This presumption could be rebutted only by a preponderance of the evidence.' The legislative history of this 1961 amendment reveals that Congress was dissatisfied with the clear, convincing, and unequivocal evidence standard and wanted to make
it more difficult for individuals to claim that expatriation was
involuntary." The amendment has forced courts to choose between
the congressional standard and the Supreme Court's Nishikawa
standard in deciding expatriation cases. Afroyim failed to resolved
14. Justice Harlan had noted these problems in advance in a footnote to his
dissent. 387 U.S. at 269 n. 1. Difficulties and confusion over these issues during
the year that followed Afroyim led to a 1969 Statement of Interpretation by the
outgoing Attorney General, Ramsey Clark. 34 Fed. Reg. 1079 (1969). See Murphy,
Loss of Nationality Under United States Law and Practice: A Foreign Policy
Perspective, 19 KA. L. Rav. 89, 95 (1970).
15. 356 U.S. 129 (1958). See note 14 supra.
16. 356 U.S. at 133.
17. Id. at 134. The Court relied on its earlier holdings in Schneiderman v.
United States, 320 U.S. 118 (1943), which held that denaturalization proceedings
require that the facts and law be construed as far as possible in favor of the
defendant, and Gonzales v. Landon, 350 U.S. 920 (1955), which held that the
same rule should be applied to expatriation cases under § 401(e) of the Nationality Act of 1940. The Court expanded the rule to apply to all cases under the
subsections of § 401. The Court found the stricter standard of proof to be justified by the legislative history of § 401.
18. Pub. L. No. 87-301, § 19, 75 Stat. 656 (1961).
19. H.R. REP. No. 1086, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 6, reprinted in [1961] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2950, 2984.
20. The Committee report states:
It is more difficult .
Nishikawa v. Dulles ....

.

and
. to subscribe to Gonzales v. Landon ...
The committee has noted that administrative

application of Nishikawa has led to rulings vitiating outright not only the
intent of the statute ...

but doing violence to its very letter by ascribing

involuntariness to absence from the United States for business purposes in
order to avoid military service.
[19611 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 2984.
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the conflict, 21 although it overruled Perez and seemed to supply for
the clear and convincing standard the fourteenth amendment rationale which the Court had declined to use in Nishikawa. In a
1969 Statement of Interpretation,22 the Attorney General in-

structed federal agencies that, "until the courts have clarified the
scope of Afroyim," the government's burden of proof for showing
voluntariness was not easily satisfied. 23 Since Afroyim, some courts
have chosen to apply the clear and convincing evidence standard. 2
Others have continued to use the statutory, preponderance of the

evidence standard.25 In 1972, the Ninth Circuit applied the statutory standard in King v. Rogers,2 to conclude that a man who had
never formally renounced United States citizenship had expatriated himself by swearing allegiance to a foreign sovereign. One

year earlier, the Burger Court had indicated doubts about the
scope of the Afroyim decision in Rogers v. Bellei,27 by finding that

the language of the fourteenth amendment did not prevent Con2

gress from expatriating citizens born outside the United States. 1
Two standards of proof remain. Despite the fact that the majority
of courts have used the Nishikawa standard,2 9 no court has recognized it as being constitutionally based.

IIL

THE INSTANT OPINION

In the instant case, the court began its analysis by stating that
Congress' retention of the power to define the standard of proof in
21. In two cases decided in the same year, King v. Rogers, 463 F.2d 1188 (9th
Cir. 1972), and Peter v. Secretary of State, 347 F. Supp. 1035 (D.D.C. 1972), the
courts required different standards of proof.
22. Statement of Attorney General Ramsey Clark, 34 Fed. Reg. 1079 (1969).
23. 'Id. at 1079-80.
24. See United States v. Matheson, 532 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1976); Peter v.
Secretary of State, 347 F. Supp. 1035.
25. See King v. Rogers, 463 F.2d 1188; Baker v. Rusk, 296 F. Supp. 1244.
26. 463 F.2d 1188.
27. 401 U.S. 815 (1971).
28. Some comijentators, including Judge Specher in the instant opinion,
have seen the Bellei decision as merely a recognition that the language of the
fourteenth amendment does not permit the Court to extend Afroyim's absolute
right of citizenship to persons who are not citizens by birth in the United States
or by naturalization. Other commentators have viewed Bellei as a "retreat from
the principles of Afroyim" that "acknowledges congressional power over some
forms of citizenship." Schwartz, American Ctizenship After Afroyim and Bellei:
Continuing Controversy, 2 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1003, 1025 (1975). [The suggestion is made that Bellei represents a shift in opinion from the Warren Court to
the Burger Court and that a reevaluation of Afroyim may soon take place.]
29. 577 F.2d at 11.
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voluntary expatriation cases is inconsistent with the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the fourteenth amendment right of citizenship in Afroyim. By reviewing the legislative history of 8 U.S.C.
§ 1481(c) the court found that Congress had recognized that a
citizen's ability to retain citizenship could be a function of the
standard of proof. The court noted that Congress had legislated a
stricter standard solely to prevent individuals it felt should be
expatriated from retaining citizenship. The court reasoned that
congressional power to define the standard of proof in voluntary
expatriation cases was, in effect, a continuing power over an individual's constitutional right to citizenship. Because Afroyim held
that the right to citizenship is guaranteed by the fourteenth
amendment and cannot be given up without the citizen's assent,
the court determined that the standard of proof in this case and
similar cases must be defined by the courts. In determining this
standard the court relied first on the Supreme Court opinion in
Nishikawa v. Dulles. Although this court was uncertain whether
the clear, convincing, and unequivocal standard applied in that
case was constitutionally derived, it nevertheless deduced that the
Nishikawa Court viewed the clear and convincing standard as best
suited to protect the individual's citizenship interest. The court
then noted that most of the lower court decisions since Afroyim
have used the Nishikawa standard. Finally, the court relied on
statements from two recent cases, as well as Chief Justice Warren's
dissent in Perez to point out that citizenship is a basic right upon
which other rights and democratic activities depend." The court
found that because society attaches great value to the right of
citizenship, ambiguities in the evidence must be resolved in favor
of citizenship, and that the minimum evidentiary standard must
adequately protect the citizenship interest. The court concluded
that the minimum standard required by the fourteenth amendment is proof by clear, convincing, and unequivocal evidence.
30. The court in United States v. Matheson stated:
An individual denied his or her United States citizenship, even if permitted
entry into the country, is denied effective participation in our country's

electoral processes, which is ordinarily regarded as a fundamental constitutional interest, as well as access to a range of livelihoods and positions
opened only to citizens of this country.

532 F.2d at 815 (citations omitted). In Peter v. Secretary of State, the court
recognized that "American citizenship is perhaps the most precious right known
to man today." 347 F. Supp. at 1038.
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IV.

COMMENT

The holding in the instant case brings together the two most
important citizenship cases decided by the Warren Court,
Nishikawa and Afroyim, to produce a badly needed definition of
the standard of evidence in voluntary expatriation cases.
Nishikawa and Afroyim must now be viewed as incomplete decisions. The Nishikawa holding failed to produce an adequate rationale for a standard of evidence which protects an individual's
constitutional right to citizenship from congressional interference.31 The Afroyim decision's failure to define the acts that constitute voluntary relinquishment or the required standard of evidence
for determining these acts permitted Congress to retain some
power over expatriation matters by determining the standard of
proof.3 2 The Seventh Circuit has recognized that these two decisions are complementary. Afroyim's declaration that the fourteenth amendment protects United States citizens from involuntary deprivation of citizenship supplies a stronger rationale for the
Nishikawa requirement of a clear, convincing, and unequivocal
evidence standard, while the Nishikawa evidence standard protects the fourteenth amendment citizenship right described in
Afroyim from congressional interference. The instant court's decision, if followed, will strengthen Afroyim. 3 A constitutionally required stricter evidence standard will make the government's task
of proving voluntary expatriation and enforcing current expatriation statutes more difficult, as cases applying the Nishikawa standard have already shown. 4 United States citizens will be able to
enter into many activities now forbidden by statute with less fear
of loss of citizenship. Examples include serving in the armed forces
of a foreign state,3 5 holding important foreign political offices, 3 and
participating in foreign political activities.3 1 Most important, the
stricter standard will facilitate the acquisition of a second nation31. It was the lack of clarity in the Nishikawa rationale that left it vulnerable
to congressional dissatisfaction and attack. See H.R. REP. No. 1086, supra note
23.
32. 577 F.2d at 10.
33. Congressional recognition of the difficulties of proving expatriation under
this standard brought about creation of the less strict standard. See notes 23 &
24 supra.
34. See United States v. Matheson, 532 F.2d 809; Peter v. Secretary of State,
347 F. Supp. 1035.
35. 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(3) (1976).
36. Id. § 1481(a)(4).
37. Id. § 1481(a)(5).
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ality by some United States citizens, insofar as the acquisition of
a particular nationality does not require the express renunciation
of United States citizenship.8 These activities may make it more

difficult, however, for the United States government to conduct
foreign policy and protect citizens living and traveling in foreign
countries, a concern of the Perez majority. 9 This concern has been
repeated by more recent commentators" who have feared that a
broad interpretation of Afroyim would lead to the impairment of
foreign policy objectives by United States citizens and increased
involvement in the internal political affairs of foreign nations. Al-

though the dangers are serious, these problems have not significantly emerged in the decade that has followed Afroyim" and may

not appear even after the instant court's broad interpretation of
Afroyim. However, because the dangers are serious, they must be

balanced against an equally important consideration, the preeminence of citizenship as a right. The language of the fourteenth

amendment may not exclude Congress from defining acts of expatriation, but as the Supreme Court, 3 the instant court," and
many other courts and commentators have found, citizenship is

universally recognized as a basic right. 5 Without this right many
38. Under the authority of Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325 (1939), it has long been
thought possible for United States citizens to acquire a second nationality as long
as renunciation of United States citizenship or an oath of allegiance to a foreign
power was not required. Since the instant court's broad interpretation of
Afroyimmay allow a person to take an oath without voluntarily relinquishing his
citizenship, such a person may take an oath with the expectation that the
Nishikawa standard of evidence will protect him in court. See 54 CoRNELL L. REv.
624 (1969).
39. 356 U.S. 44 (1958); see notes 15 & 16 supra.
40. See Dionisopoulos, Afroyim v. Rusk: The Evolution, Uncertainty and
Implications of a ConstitutionalPrinciple,55 MNN. L. REV. 235 (1970); Murphy,
Loss of Nationality' Under United States Law and Practice:A Foreign Policy
Perspective, 19 KAN. L. REv. 89 (1970).
41. Dionisopoulos, supra note 40; Murphy, supra note 40. These critics were
concerned that Afroyim would encourage United States nationals to enlist in the
Israeli, Rhodesian, Cuban, or other armies and thereby increase the likelihood of
United States involvement. They were also concerned about a proliferation of
persons with dual citizenship and the confusion it would create about duties owed
to different states. To date, few difficulties of this nature have reached the courts
and the United States has not been drawn into serious international problems by
the actions of its nationals serving in foreign armies or performing one of the other
acts of expatriation noted in 8 U.S.C. § 1481(1976).
42. See Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. at 268-93 (Harlan J., dissenting).
43. Id. at 267-68.
44. 577 F.2d at 11-12.
45. Article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaims that
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of the participatory rights of a free society are not possible." If
these rights are not subject to deprivation by a legislative body,4"
neither should be the right upon which they are based. The instant
court has shown that Congress intended to introduce a standard
which could deprive individuals of a basic right, simply because it
had felt that they should be expatriated. The instant court was
correct in deciding that citizenship was a matter too important and
too valued to be left to the changing judgment of Congress."'
Clark C. Siewert
everyone has a right to a nationality and should not be arbitrarily deprived of it.
G.A. Res. 217, U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71(1948), reprinted in OFFICE OF PUBLIC INFORMATION, UNITED NATIONS, EVERYMAN'S UNITED NATIONS 588 (8th ed. 1968).
46.

See 577 F.2d at 11-13; United States v. Matheson, 532 F.2d at 815.

47. Although the Bill of Rights also protects the rights of aliens, only citizens
have the right to vote, hold office, and be immune from deportation. See generally
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2; id. art. 2, § 1; id. amend. XIV, § 1. Deportation is not
mentioned in the Constitution, but only aliens are deported. See, e.g., Fong Yue
Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893).
48. 577 F.2d at 10.

EXTRADITION-DOUBLE JEOPARDY PROVISION OF EXTRADrTON
TREATY APPLIES
RATIFICATION

EVEN

WHERE

CRIME

COMMITTED

BEFORE

I. FACTS AND HOLDING
Appellant, a United States citizen, was tried and sentenced by
a United States court' for securities fraud carried on in both the
United States and Canada. He had been the subject of several
federal indictments in the United States, and had agreed to cooperate with the federal government in exchange for being allowed
to plead guilty to only two of the indictments.2 The prosecution
was intended to cover all fraudulent involvement by appellant
which came within the jurisdiction of the United States Department of Justice.3 On February 6, 1973, a Canadian information was
filed in Montreal charging Galanis with having defrauded Champion Savings Corp., Ltd., a Canadian corporation, and its creditors
of securities valued at 1.6 million Canadian dollars in 1971 and
1972. Government counsel then applied to the District Court of
Connecticut for a warrant requiring appellant to appear before the
court for a hearing to determine if probable cause existed to sustain
the Canadian charges.' The court found probable cause and ordered appellant to remain in custody until an extradition warrant
could be issued by the Secretary of State. Appellant sued for habeas corpus, 5 arguing that extradition violated the double jeopardy
provision contained in the current extradition treaty' between the
1.

United States v. Galanis, 429 F. Supp. 1215 (D. Conn. 1977).

2. The two indictments carried maximum penalties of ten years imprisonment and fines of $20,000 each. Appellant was sentenced for both crimes on
February 2, 1973. He served six months of a five-year prison sentence, and was
then granted probation. Id. at 1219.

3.

The Assistant United States Attorney in charge of the prosecution against

appellant testified, however, that appellant's guilty pleas were also intended to
cover the fraud perpetrated upon Champion Savings Corp. Ltd., a Canadian
corporation. Galanis v. Pallanck, 568 F.2d 234, 236 (2d Cir. 1977).
4. Government counsel made application on September 1, 1976, pursuant to
18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1976), which governs extradition of persons in the United States

to foreign countries. Section 3184 requires that a hearing be held in either federal
or state court, at the request of the government. If the court finds probable cause
to sustain the charge, it certifies that finding to the Secretary of State who takes
appropriate steps to secure extradition upon request of the foreign government.
5. In extradition proceedings, the judge's decision itself is not appealable. The
accused can petition the courts, however, for a writ of habeas corpus to examine
questions of jurisdiction. Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270, 278 (1902).
6. Treaty on Extradition, Dec. 3, 1971, United States-Canada [1976]
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United States and Canada.' The government maintained that appellant's status was not governed by the current treaty,' but by an
earlier treaty which contained no double jeopardy provision. 9 The
District Court of Connecticut denied appellant's petition. On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit,
reversed. Held: Where a crime has been committed before ratification of a treaty, but extradition proceedings are begun after the
exchange of ratifications, the double jeopardy clause of the treaty
applies.' 0 Galanis v. Pallanck, 568 F.2d 234 (2d Cir. 1977).
II.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

Extradition is a matter of comity rather than a legal duty." The
1 U.S.T. 983, T.I.A.S. No. 8237 [hereinafter cited as 1971 Treaty]. This treaty
specified as extraditable any offense against federal laws relating to the sale or
purchase of securities. The double jeopardy provisions are in id. art. 4(1)(i).
7. In addition to the double jeopardy claim, appellant also argued that he had
been given a grant of immunity in exchange for his cooperation, that the government violated the immunity by using information supplied by appellant to support his extradition, and that depositions taken in Switzerland and presented in
evidence by the government had not been properly authenticated. The instant
court found the double jeopardy argument dispositive. 568 F.2d at 236.
8. The government based this assertion on the "except" clause:
This treaty shall terminate and replace any extradition agreements and
provisions on extradition in any other agreement in force between the
United States and Canada; except that the crimes listed in such agreements
and committed prior to entry into force of this Treaty shall be subject to
extradition pursuant to the provisions of such agreements.
1971 Treaty, supra note 6, art. 18(2).
9. Webster-Ashburton Treaty, Aug. 8, 1842, United States-Great Britain, art.
X, 8 Stat. 572. The provisions of this treaty were modified by the following
agreements: T.S. No. 119; Convention, July 12, 1889, 26 Stat. 1508, T.S. No. 139;
Supplementary Extradition Convention, Dec. 13, 1900, 32 Stat. 1864, T.S. No.
391 [item 11 added "obtaining money, valuable securities or other property by
false pretenses" as an extraditable offense]; Supplementary Extradition Convention, Apr. 12, 1905, 34 Stat. 2903, T.S. No. 458; Supplementary Extradition
Convention, May 15, 1922, 42 Stat. 2224, T.S. No. 666; Convention to Provide
for Extradition on Account of Crimes or Offenses Against Narcotic Laws, Jan. 8,
1925, 44 Stat. 2100, T.S. No. 719; Supplementary Convention for the Mutual
Extradition of Fugitive Criminals, Oct. 26, 1951, [1952] 2 U.S.T. 2826, T.I.A.S.
No. 2454.
10. The Court of Appeals did not reach or consider the question of whether
the double jeopardy clause of the 1971 Treaty would apply in proceedings
brought, but not concluded, prior to the exchange of ratifying instruments. 568
F.2d at 239.
11. Bassiouni, International Extradition:A Summary of the Contemporary
American Practiceand a Proposed Formula,15 WAYNE L. REv. 733, 734 (1969); 6
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 299, 301 (1972).

Fall 1978]

l RECENT DECISIONS

fifth amendment has been construed to require that a treaty 2 or
federal enactment exist before the government can return a fugitive to a requesting state. " Where treaty provisions concerning
extradition are arguably ambiguous, the judiciary has exercised
wide powers of interpretation in order to safeguard the rights of the
accused. 4 United States courts have based their interpretations
both on standards accepted by the international community, especially when justifying a liberal interpretation effecting private
rights,' 5 and on the travaux preparatoriesin an attempt to determine the purposes and principles of a treaty.'" In addition, courts
have interpreted treaties in the light of other similar treaties, or
on the basis of traditional policies and practices of a signatory."
Domestic court decisions reflect United States policy on a number
of questions of treaty interpretation. In In re De Giacomo, the court
held that, barring an express provision to the contrary, treaties are
presumptively retroactive in application." De Giacomo has been
upheld by federal courts in United States ex rel. Oppenheim v.
2" The United
Hecht,"' and more recently in Gallina v. Fraser.
States Supreme Court has implicitly approved the reasoning in the
De Giacomo line of cases by refusing to review the decisions in
Oppenheim and Gallina. Courts have been sensitive, however, to
attempts by the drafters of treaties to overcome the De Giacomo
presumption. In United States v. Flores,' the court held that language in the 1970 Extradition Treaty between the United States
and Spain was intended to overcome the presumption of retroactive application. According to the court, the treaty did so by pro12. Article X of the Webster-Ashburton Treaty of 1842, supra note 9, set the
pattern of extradition based on listed offenses. Timbers & Pollack, Extradition
from Canada to the United States for Securities Fraud: Frustrationof the National Policies of Both Countries, 24 FORDHAM L. REv. 301, 305 (1955).
13. Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 287 (1933).
14. Bassiouni, InternationalExtradition in American Practice and World
Public Order, 36 TENN.L. REv. 1, 27 (1969).
15. Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. at 293-94.
16. Timbers & Pollack, supra note 12, at 324.
17. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31(3)(b), opened for
signatureMay 23, 1969, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39-127 (1969), cited in BASic DocuMENTS IN INTERNATIoNAL LAW 233 (I. Brownlie ed. 1972).
18. 7 F. Cas. 366, 368 (C.C.S.D. N.Y. 1874) (No. 3,747).
19. 16 F.2d 955 (2d Cir. 1927), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 769 (1927).
20. 177 F. Supp. 856 (D. Conn.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 851 (1960).
21. 538 F.2d 939, 945 (2d Cir. 1976).
22. Treaty on Extradition, May 29, 1970, United States-Spain, [19711
1 U.S.T. 737, T.I.A.S. No. 7136.
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viding that extraditable offenses under the former treaty committed before the entry into force of the new treaty would not be
subject to extradition pursuant to the provisions of the new treaty.
National policy is less clear in regard to the double jeopardy doctrine in extradition proceedings. 2 On the international level, the
doctrine of separate sovereignties prevails. This doctrine provides
theoretically for the extradition of An accused, already convicted
in one forum, to be prosecuted for the same crime in a second or
third forum.24 Each prosecution is for an offense committed against
a separate sovereign power. Similarly, the test for double jeopardy,
as clarified by the United States Supreme Court in Fox v. Ohio,25
is not one punishment for each act but rather, one punishment for
each offense. In keeping with English common law traditions, however, United States courts have been unwilling, absent
''compelling circumstances," to sanction retrial of a defendant
where overlapping jurisdiction with a foreign court is recognized. 2
Courts have based their reasoning on the internationally observed
requirement of double criminality in extradition proceedings,
which requires that the act be an offense under the laws of both
the asylum and requesting state. 2 In balancing the doctrine of
fairness with the doctrine of separate sovereignties, authorities
have argued that great weight should be given to the defense of
double jeopardy, because extradition can constitute a final disposition of the accused's rights where he has already been convicted
in the asylum state. 2 This attitude toward double jeopardy has
been incorporated into bipartite and multipartite treaties on extradition to insure that extradition for the same crime would not be
23. The United States has traditionally opposed the practice of exempting
nationals from extradition. Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447, 467 (1913).
24. Bassiouni, supra note 14, at 10.
25. 46 U.S. 447, 5 How. 410 (1847).
26. See Franck, An InternationalLawyer Looks at the Barthus Rule, 34
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1096 (1959). In England, acquittal by one nation prevents retrial
by another. Fisher, Double Jeopardy, Two Sovereignties and the Intruding
Constitution, 28 U. CHI. L. REv. 591, 603 (1961). In addition, there is civil law

precedent for applying double jeopardy protection in extradition proceedings.
CODE DE PROCEDURE PENAL [French Code of Criminal Procedure], arts. 5, 7, cited
in Franck, supra, at 1100.
27. Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309 (1922); Wright v. Henkel, 190 U.S. 40
(1903).
28. Morrison, Extraditionfrom Canada: Rights of the Fugitive Following
Committal for Surrender, 19 CRiM. L.Q. 366, 369-70 (1977). From the standpoint
of the accused, it makes no difference whether successive prosecutions are by the

same or different sovereign powers. Fisher, supra note 26, at 598.
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granted where proceedings had been completed in the asylum
state. 9 A clear indication of the evolution in United States policy
regarding the doctrines of double jeopardy and separate sovereignties is provided by the state and federal case law, which addresses
the doctrine of separate sovereignties as between state and federal
courts." The rule in Fox was reaffirmed by the Court in United
States v. Lanza,3 1 and more recently in Abbate v. United States2
and Bartkus v. Illinois.1 The corroboration of the doctrine of separate sovereignties in the state/federal context in Abbate and
Bartkus was, however, a minimum standard set by the Court.3
Since these decisions every state has ruled against double jeopardy
based on separate sovereignties either by statute or case law. 5
Furthermore, after A bbate and Bartkus, the attorney general indi-

cated that the federal government would not, except in

"compelling circumstances," prosecute for the same act after a
state prosecution." Ten years later, in Benton v. Maryland,3 by
29. HARVARD RESEARCH IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, DRAFT TREATY
art. 9, reprinted in 29 Am. J. INT'L L. 144-48 (Supp. 1935).

ON EXTRADITION,

30. Bassiouni, supra note 11, at 745.
31. 260 U.S. 377 (1922) (defendants charged with manufacturing, transporting
and possessing intoxicating liquor in violation of the National Prohibition Act).
32. 359 U.S. 187 (1959).
33. 359 U.S. 121 (1959).
34. In Bartkus the majority observed: "The Anglo-American system of law is
based not upon transcendental revelation but upon the conscience of society
ascertained as best it may be by a tribunal disciplined for the task and environed
by the best safeguards for disinterestedness and detachment." Id. at 128. See also
Stewart, Justice Stewart Discussses Right of Counsel, 19 LEGAL AID BRIEF CASE
91 (1960). Justice Stewart stated: "The Supreme Court of the United States is
ultimately concerned only with deciding the absolute minimum standards that
the Constitution will tolerate." Id. at 92.
35. In addition, both federal and state courts have heeded the Supreme
Court's encouragement in Bartkus to apply common sense limitations when double jeopardy due to separate sovereignties is at issue. Commonwealth v. Cepulonis, 373 N.E.2d 1136, 1140 (Mass. 1978).
36. The Attorney General issued a directive to United States Attorneys advising them of the limits he placed on the power granted in Abbate and Barthus:
"No federal case should be tried when there has already been a state prosecution
for substantially the same act or acts without the United States Attorney first
submitting a recommendation to the appropriate Assistant Attorney General in
the department." Department of Justice Press Release (April 7, 1959), reprinted
in 27 U.S.L.W. 2509 (1959).
37. 395 U.S. 784 (1969) (overruling Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937)).
In defining the doctrine in North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969),
the Court had stated that the guaranty against double jeopardy protects against
a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal or after conviction, and
against multiple punishments for the same offense.
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holding the double jeopardy clause applicable to the states via the
fourteenth amendment, the Court called into question the continuing validity of the line of cases ending with Bartkus.'8 Thus it
appears that while Bartkus has not been expressly overruled, both
the courts and the federal executive branch are mindful of the need
to protect an accused against double jeopardy, that this concern
has been incorporated into many extradition treaties, indicating a
national policy in keeping with accepted international standards
of justice, and that courts would be correct in interpreting ambiguous treaty provisions in light of this policy.
III. THE INSfANT OPNON
In the instant decision, the court acknowledged that appellant
had been tried and punished in the United States for the offense
upon which the Canadian extradition request was based. The court
noted that the stated purpose of the 1971 Treaty was to modernize
extradition relations between the United States and Canada.39 The
court found that the purpose of the draftsmen in including the
"except" clause was (1) to insure that persons extraditable under
previous treaties would not gain immunity when these treaties
were terminated and replaced by the new treaty, and (2) that there
would be no ex postfacto application of offenses which had become
extraditable through the 1971 Treaty. Citing Gallina v. Fraser,the
court took note of the long-established rule that, absent a clause
to the contrary, offenses committed prior to the conclusion of an
extradition treaty are covered by the new treaty."0 It was noted that
several recent treaties, in contrast to the treaty with Canada, expressly apply to offenses committed before the effective date of the
new treaty which were not previously grounds for extradition."
38. The question was raised again in Smith v. United States, 423 U.S. 1303,
1307 (1975) (Douglas, J.). In that case Justice Douglas granted a stay of a district
court order that files of a federal grand jury be turned over to a state prosecutor.
39. Message from the President Transmitting the Treaty on Extradition Between the United States and Canada, S. Exsc. Doc. No. G, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.
3 (1974), noted in Galanis v. Pollanck, 568 F.2d at 237.
40. Id. at 237-38. The 1971 Treaty, supra note 6, provided in article 18(3) that
upon exchange of ratificationp, the treaty would enter into force. The 1971 Treaty
was ratified on March 22, 1976. Canada had requested extradition of appellant
on February 6, 1973. The government sought an extradition hearing on September
1, 1976, and the hearing commenced on November 23, 1976. United States v.
Galanis, 429 F. Supp. at 1216-17.

41. The court cited the following treaties as examples: Treaty on Extradition,
May 14, 1974, United States-Australia, [1976] 1 U.S.T. 957, T.I.A.S. No. 8234;

Treaty on Extradition, May 24, 1973, United States-Paraguay, [1974] 1 U.S.T.
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Observing that the 1971 Treaty with Canada significantly expanded the list of extraditable crimes, the court interpreted the
"except" clause as rebutting the ex post facto presumption, while
simultaneously insuring that persons extraditable under previous
treaties would not gain immunity under the 1971 Treaty.2 In addition, the court pointed out that the protection against double jeopardy is a common element of recent extradition treaties, 3 that the

United States Supreme Court has evidenced concern about double
jeopardy between the state and federal systems, and that the Department of Justice has adopted a policy against initiating duplicative federal/state prosecutions. Accordingly, the court concluded
that the double jeopardy clause of the 1971 Treaty applied to extradition proceedings begun after the new treaty went into effect.
IV.

COMMENT

The instant court's interpretation of the 1971 Treaty is an example of protection of international individual rights through judicial
activism. By calling into question a treaty provision which arguably prohibited a defense of double jeopardy for crimes committed
before the treaty became effective, the instant opinion suggests
that the double jeopardy doctrine is such a strong national policy
that it will be found in a treaty absent an unambiguous provision
to the contrary. By implying that the double jeopardy doctrine is
967, T.I.A.S. No. 7838; Treaty on Extradition, Jan. 18, 1973, United States-Italy,
[1974] 1 U.S.T. 493, T.I.A.S. No. 8052; Treaty on Extradition, Jan. 12, 1970,
United States-New Zealand, [1971] 1 U.S.T. 1, T.I.A.S. No. 7035. Galanis v.
Pollanck, 568 F.2d at 238.
42. The court explicitly rejected the interpretation of the Assistant Legal
Adviser for Management in the Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State,
noting that although the views of the State Department are entitled to respect,
they are not binding upon the court. Id. at 239.
43. The court cited the following treaties: Treaty on Extradition, May 14,
1974, United States-Australia, [1976] 1 U.S.T. 957, T.I.A.S. No. 8234; Treaty
on Extradition, Jan. 18, 1973, United States-Italy, [1975] 1 U.S.T. 493, T.I.A.S.
No. 8052; Treaty on Extradition, June 22, 1972, United States-Denmark, [1974]
2 U.S.T. 1293, T.I.A.S. No. 7864; Treaty on Extradition, Jan. 21, 1972, United
States-Argentina, [1972] 4 U.S.T. 3501, T.I.A.S. No. 7510; Supplementary Convention to the Extradition Convention of Jan. 6, 1909, Feb. 12, 1970, United
States-France, [1971] 1 U.S.T. 407, T.I.A.S. No. 7075; Treaty on Extradition,
Jan. 12, 1970, United States-New Zealand, [1971] 1 U.S.T. 1, T.I.A.S. No. 7035;
Convention on Extradition, Dec. 10, 1962, United States-Israel, [1963] 1 U.S.T.
1707, T.I.A.S. No. 5476; Convention on Extradition, Oct. 24, 1961, United StatesSweden, [1963] 2 U.S.T. 1845, T.I.A.S. No. 5496; Treaty on Extradition, Dec.
18, 1947, United States-Union of South Africa, [1951] 1 U.S.T. 884, T.I.A.S. No.
2243. Id. at 238.
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national policy as reflected in recent treaties, the court has established a precedent which supports a fundamental right guaranteed
by the fifth amendment, but avoids any implication of preferential
treatment of United States nationals in extradition proceedings.
The importance of the court's decision lies not only in its effect on
the immediate status of extradition relations with Canada, but
also in the precedent established by ruling in favor of the appellant's double jeopardy argument. The court, in finding a double
jeopardy defense in the face of a separate sovereignties argument,
has significantly eroded any implications Abbate and Bartkus
might have for international law. The ultimate significance of the
instant decision depends on whether subsequent cases rely on this
case to find double jeopardy to be an overriding policy consideration. If the instant opinion does become the accepted rule, then the
instant court has served to clarify the heretofore nebulous guidelines for extradition proceedings.4 4 If the instant decision is later
found, however, to apply only to the specific fact pattern of this
case, then this opinion is merely one more element in a nonuniform series of rules and decisions concerning extradition. The
language in the instant opinion suggested that a government showing of "compelling circumstances" could lead to an exception to
the double jeopardy doctrine.4 5 A more intricate decision, and one
not reached in this opinion, is a determination of the gravity of
''compelling circumstances" which could overcome the double
jeopardy doctrine. The clear implication of this opinion is that the
judiciary, rather than the political branch, will decide this question when it arises.4 Thus, the instant decision promotes individual rights over the doctrine of separate sovereignties by interpreting a treaty so as to find a double jeopardy defense applicable, but
the long-term effect will depend on whether this precedent is
broadly applied and on how courts interpret "compelling circumstances."
Michael P. Peck
44. Bassiouni, supra note 14, at 28.
45.
46.

Galanis v. Pollanck, 568 F.2d at 238.

See id. at 239.

SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY-SERVICE OF PROCESS IN THE UNITED
STATES ON A PERMANENT MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS MUST
CONFORM TO THE SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS OF THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN

IMMUNITIES ACT

I.

FACTS AND HOLDING

Plaintiff, first mortgagee of a New York City building, brought
a foreclosure action against defendant, the Permanent Mission of
the People's Republic of the Congo to the United Nations (Congo
Mission). The Congo Mission, made no further payments to discharge plaintiff's first mortgage. The New York State Supreme

Court entered a default judgement against the defendant,1 who
then had the action removed to the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York. Defendant moved to dismiss on the ground that the New York Supreme Court lacked
personal jurisdiction over the Congo Mission because service of
process did not conform to the requirements of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. 2 On defendants motion to dismiss and plain1. The court entered a judgment of foreclosure and sale against the defendant
Congo Mission.
2. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602 - 1611 (1976).
Section 1608 reads:
(a) Service in the courts of the United States and of the States shall be
made upon a foreign state or political subdivision of a foreign state:
(1) by delivery of a copy of the summons and complaint in accordance
with any special arrangement for service between the plaintiff and the
foreign state or political subdivision; or
(2) if no special arrangement exists by delivery of a copy of the summons and complaint in accordance with an applicable international
convention on service of judicial documents; or
(3) if service cannot be made under paragraphs (1) or (2), by sending
a copy of the summons and complaint and a notice of suit, together
with a translation of each into the official language of the foreign
state, by any form of mail requiring a signed receipt, to be addressed
and dispatched by the clerk of the court to the head of the ministry
of foreign affairs of the foreign state concerned, or
(4) if service cannot be made within 30 days under paragraph (3),
by sending two copies of the summons and complaint and a notice
of suit, together with a translation of each into the official language
of the foreign state, by any form of mail requiring a signed receipt,
to be addressed and dispatched by the clerk of the court to the Secretary of State in Washington, District of Columbia, to the attention
of the Director of Special Consular Services-and the Secretary shall
transmit one copy of the papers through diplomatic channels to the
foreign state and shall send to the clerk of the court a certified copy
of the diplomatic note indicating when the papers were transmitted.
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tiffs motion to remand to the state courts, default judgment vacated and the action dismissed. Held: A permanent mission to the
United Nations is the embodiment of a foreign state and service
of process on a permanent mission must conform to the formal
requirements of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. Gray v.
Permanent Mission of the Peoples Republic of the Congo to the
United Nations, 443 F. Supp. 816 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
I.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

Before the Sovereign Immunities Act became effective on January 19, 1977, process was generally served upon a foreign state by
attachment of the foreign state's property. 3 Attachment could interrupt the orderly functioning of foreign government offices, immobilize assets needed for debt payment, and exacerbate political
tensions between the United States and foreign sovereigns.4 DeAs used in this subsection, a notice of suit shall mean a notice addressed
to a foreign state and in a form prescribed by the Secretary of State by
regulation.
(b) Service in the courts of the United States and of the States shall be made upon
an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state:
(1) by delivery of a copy of the summons and complaint in accordance
with any special arrangement for service between the plaintiff and the
agency or instrumentality; or
(2) if no special arrangement exists, by delivery of a copy of the
summons and complaint either to an officer, a managing or general
agent, or to any other agent authorized by appointment or by law to
receive service of process in the United States; or in accordance with
an applicable international convention on service of judicial documents; or
(3) if service cannot be made under paragraphs (1) or (2), and if
reasonably calculated to give actual notice, by delivery of a copy of
the summons and complaint, together with a translation of each into
the official language of the foreign state(A) as directed by an authority of the foreign state or political
subdivision in response to a letter rogatory or request or
(B) by any form of mail requiring a signed receipt, to be addressed and dispatched by the clerk of the court to the agency
or instrumentality to be served, or
(c) as directed by order of the court consistent with the law of the place
where service is to be made.
3. See generally Miller, Service of Process on State, Local, and ForeignGovernments Under Rule 4, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure-Some Unfinished
Business for the Rulemakers, 46 F.R.D. 101 (1969); Note, Amenability of Foreign
Sovereigns to Federal In Personam Jurisdiction,14 VA. J. IW'L I. 487 (1974).
4. For these reasons, the question of sovereign immunity had been left to the
executive branch prior to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. See Rich v.
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spite the negative consequences of attachment, no other effective
means for service of process on a foreign state existed. Personal
service on an embassy is a felony 5 and service by mail is regarded
by the State Department as a violation of article 31 of the Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations which extends immunity to
ambassadors from the civil and administrative jurisdiction of the
states to which they are attached.' Further, Rule 4 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure provides no means for service of process
on foreign states or their agencies or instrumentalities, 7 except
where an agency or instrumentality is considered a foreign corporation

. . .

or other association under Federal Rule 4 (d)(3) .1 Rule 4

(d)(3) however has never successfully been employed as a means
of service upon a foreign state Only if the sovereign has consented
to jurisdiction have the courts permitted service of process under
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."
Section 1608 of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act precludes
attachment of foreign property and sets forth two means for effecting service of process on foreign states and their agencies. Under
Naviera Vacuba S.A., 295 F.2d 24 (4th Cir. 1961) (attachment of hijacked Cuban
merchant vessel denied).
5. 22 U.S.C. §§ 252 - 253 (1976); cf. Hellenic Lines, Ltd. v. Moore, 345 F.2d
978 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (personal jurisdiction could not be made by personal service
of summons upon ambassador as agent for foreign government).
6. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227,
T.I.A.S. No. 7502, 500 U.N.T.S. 95. Service of process upon the foreign state by
mail sent to other than a diplomatic official or embassy would be consistent with
articles 22 and 31 of the Convention because diplomatic immunity refers to the
person of the foreign official and not to the foreign state itself. See Lowefeld,
Claims Against ForeignStates - A Proposalfor Reform of United States Law,
44 N.Y.U. L. Rxv. 901, 934 (1969).
7. See Note, Sovereign Immunity - ProposedStatutory Eliminationof State
Department Role - Attachment, Service of Process, and Execution, 15 HAnv.
INT'L

L.J. 157, 163-4 (1974).

8. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(3). See e.g., Kane v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 267 F. Supp. 709 (E.D. Pa. 1967), aff'd 394 F.2d 131 (3d Cir. 1968); cf. Victory
Transport Inc. v. Comisaria General de Abastecimientos y Transportes, 336 F.2d
354 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965) (foreign state could be served
under federal rule of-civil procedure 4(d)(7) when state official implicitly consented to jurisdiction of court by signing agreement to arbitrate in New York).
9. See Petrol Shipping Corp. v. Greece, 360 F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1966). The court,
per Smith, J., stated, [W]e do not equate presence, or amenability to suit, with
service of process, as our treatment of these two questions here indicates, and we
regard Rule 4 as speaking to service alone, and not both service and amenability.
Id. at 109.
10. Id. Under FED.R.C.P. 83, process was served on a foreign state which
implicitly consented to jurisdiction through an arbitration agreement.
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both procedures, the preferrable manner of service is by delivery
of the summons and complaint in a manner agreed upon by the
parties." In the absence of an agreement, service is to be made in
accordance with an applicable international convention on service
of judicial documents.' 2 Pursuant to section 1608(a) alternate service may be made upon the head of the ministry of foreign affairs
by any form of mail requiring a signed receipt. 3 If this method of
service is not effectuated, the Secretary of State must transmit
notice through diplomatic channels to the foreign state.'4 Under
section 1608(b), service upon an agency or instrumentality 5 may
be made either:' 6 (1) as directed by an authority of the foreign state
in response to a letter rogatory or request (2) by certified or registered mail dispatched by the clerk of the court or (3) as directed
by court order. 7
III. THE INSTANT OPINION

In the instant opinion the district court found that the Congo
Mission was the embodiment of a foreign state rather than an
agency or instrumentality thereof'8 and found that service on the
11. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1608(a)(1), 1608(b)(1) (1976).
12. Id. §3 1608(a)(2), 1608(b)(2). The only such convention to which the
United States is presently a party is the Hague Convention on Service Abroad of
Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents, Nov. 15, 1965, 20 U.S.T. 361, T.I.A.S. No.
6638, 658 U.N.T.S. 163.
13. Id. § 1608(a)(3). The term notice of suit used in this subsection would
advise a foreign state of the legal proceeding, explain the legal significance of the
summons, complaint, and service, and indicate what steps are available under
or required by United States law in order to defend the action. In short, it would
provide an introductory explanation to a foreign state that may be unfamiliar
with the United States law or procedure. H.R. Rep. No. 94 - 1487 94th Cong. 2d
Sess. 15, reprinted in (1976) U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 6604, 6623.
14. 28 U.S.C. § 1608(a)(4) (1976).
15. The Act defines an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state as any
entity:
(1) which is a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise and
(2) which is an organ of a foreign state or political subdivision thereof, or a
majority of whose shares or other ownership interest is owned by a foreign
state or political subdivision thereof, and
(3) which is neither a citizen of a State of the United States as defimed in
section 1332(c) and (d) of this title, nor created under the laws of any third
country.
16, The alternative selected must be the one most likely to give actual notice
to the agency or instrumentality. Id. § 1608(b)(3).
17. Id., §§ 1608(b)(1) - (3).
18. The district court based this conclusion on the legislative history of section
1610, which governs exceptions to a foreign states immunity from attachment or
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Congo Mission must conform to section 1608(a) rather than

1608(b).' 9 Because there was no arrangement between plaintiff and
defendant for service and no applicable international convention
for service, the court concluded that service did not conform to
subsections one and two of section 1608(a). Additionally since service was not mailed to the head of the ministry of foreign affairs of
the United States Secretary of State, the court further concluded
that service did not conform to subsections three and four of section 1608(a) and therefore was insufficient under the Act. The
district court noted that because the Act stipulated specific notice
requirements, informal notice ' even if adequate to inform a foreign
state of an action, would be insufficient. The district court found
that strict adherence to the notice provisions would be required
because the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act evidences congressional concern for difficulties inherent in cross-cultural and multilingual litigation.2' The district court, therefore, decided that any
party seeking to serve process on a foreign state or its agency or
instrumentality must strictly comply with the notice provisions
specified in section 1608.
IV.

COMMENT

In its strict application of the notice requirements of section 1608
of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, the instant court set
precedent by relying on statutory standards rather than ad hoc
determinations of sufficiency of service. The opinion provides a
reasonable rationale for strict compliance with the Act by recognizing Congress' explicit concern that a foreign state understand the
execution, in which the House Report stated that such buildings (including diplo-

matic and consular missions) are those of the foreign state itself. H.R. Rep. No.
94 - 1487, 94th Cong. 2d Sess. 15, reprintedin (1976) U.S. Code Cong. &Ad. News
6604, 6628.
19. The court noted in its footnote 4 that if section 1608(b) was applicable,
subsection 2 would permit in - hand service of a summons and complaint on an
officer, a managing or general agent, or to any other agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process in the United States. Since the
plaintiff stated that it served only defendants secretary, the district court indicated that service would be insufficient even under section 1608(b). Gray v. Permanent Mission, 443 F. Supp. 816, 820 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
20. The plaintiffs attorney stated that in addition to service on the Congo
Missions secretary, she wrote or telephoned the Missions Ambassador or representatives advising them of their rights, duties and obligations.

21. The district court noted that 28 U.S.C. 1608(a)(1) and (2) called for a prior
agreement between the litigants, and 1608(a) (3) and (4) require translation of the
summons and complaint into the language of the party to be served.
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complaint and legal action required. The district court suggests
that such understanding is achieved through compliance with the
provisions of section 1608(a) and (b). By linking this need for understanding with the notice provisions of the Act the court avoids
a subjective knowledge requirement in favor of the objective provisions of section 1608. Strict judicial application of the section 1608
standard should render consistent decisions on sufficiency of service on foreign states and hasten compliance with notice provisions.22 Consistency is particularly desirable since litigants are required under the Act to venture from the traditional method of
service by attachment to the statutory requirement of "notice of
suit" served on the foreign state.
Joe Bernard Foltz
22. See 40 D 6262 Realty Corp. v. United Arab Emirates Government, 447 F.
Supp. 710 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). In this decision, one month after Gray, the court held

that service consisting of attaching a copy of notice of petition to premises in
question and mailing a copy to foreign states permanent mission was inadequate

under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.

